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After several decades in which public-sector enterprises (PSEs) played
large and often increasing roles in national economies in most countries in
the world, the past two decades have seen a reversal. In industrial coun-
tries, privatization eﬀorts started in the late 1970s and 1980s as concerns
with the eﬃciency and cost-eﬀectiveness of state-owned enterprises
mounted. During that same period, it was becoming increasingly evident
that PSEs in many developing countries were not fulﬁlling their intended
roles—they were high-cost monopolies, often greatly overstaﬀed as politi-
cians used them to provide employment for friends and relatives. Privati-
zation began tentatively in a few countries, and then picked up momentum
in both the pioneers and others. The original motives were buttressed by
the need for revenues from privatization and from elimination of PSE
losses to reduce ﬁscal deﬁcits, as the costs of inﬂation became increasingly
evident. Then, in the early 1990s, the collapse of the command economies
of the former Soviet Union and of Eastern Europe resulted in strong pres-
sures for rapid privatization in those countries. By the late 1990s, increased
appreciation of the importance of the ﬁnancial sector’s eﬃcient operation
led to intensiﬁed eﬀorts for privatization of ﬁnancial institutions, as well.
Privatization did not always proceed smoothly, however. There were
questions associated with methods of privatization, as well as with the
structuring of the environment for operation of newly privatized ﬁrms.
With regard to the former, governments found themselves under attack
because public enterprises had been “given away” or sold too cheaply, or
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of the National Bureau of Economic Research.because ownership had been granted to cronies rather than to the most de-
serving. When, in Eastern European countries, citizens were given shares
in individual enterprises, concerns arose that there would be no eﬀective
ownership control over management; when enterprises were instead sold
to a few large buyers (especially if they were foreign), allegations of mo-
nopoly power were made. Questions also arose as to the desirable degree of
restructuring of PSEs that should occur prior to privatization. Controver-
sies also surrounded eﬀorts to shed excess manpower, either while enter-
prises were still in the public sector or when new owners attempted to re-
duce costs.
Moreover, it became clear that it was not enough to transfer ownership
to the private sector, even if the problems enumerated above were satisfac-
torily addressed. Once ﬁrms were no longer publicly owned, key issues
arose with respect to corporate control of management and the environ-
ment in which the newly privatized enterprises functioned. Some enter-
prises were privatized with owners who had little control over manage-
ments, which continued to run their ﬁrms in the same ways as before. Some
privatized ﬁrms were natural monopolies, and where regulatory frame-
works (or competition) were not provided, the new owners simply reaped
monopoly proﬁts (although there is evidence that many of these owners did
reduce costs at least to a degree).
As if these problems were not enough, it quickly became evident that for
markets to function well, an appropriate infrastructure is necessary. This
infrastructure requires a legal framework in which corporate governance,
a commercial code, and other rules of the game are elaborated and en-
forced. Corporate governance entails not only the relations of owners to
managers, but the rights of minority shareholders, regulations governing
accounting procedures and the provision of information to shareholders,
and accountability of boards of directors. Commercial codes enforce con-
tracts and enable transactions to take place over time. Bankruptcy laws
provide creditor protection and enable preservation of value or orderly
exit, whichever is appropriate.
Most of the lessons learned to date have come through experience. Pri-
vatizations deemed no more than partially successful have resulted in
greater appreciation of the legal environment and infrastructure in which
private enterprises have functioned in many market economies. Features—
such as bankruptcy and minority shareholder rights—previously taken for
granted have been better understood as analysts have examined the impli-
cations of their absence or malfunctioning. As experience with privatiza-
tion has grown, so has appreciation and understanding of the issues in-
volved in successful privatization. Successful outcomes depend not only
(and perhaps least) on the successful sale of the company, but more im-
portantly on the rights of owners, the legal framework in which corporate
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the privatized ﬁrms to respond as competitors rather than as monopolists.
In this volume, some of the main lessons from privatization in the East
Asian region are brought together and analyzed. The ﬁrst three papers pro-
vide overviews of key aspects of the process.
In chapter 1, Simon Johnson and Andrei Schleifer note that “[p]rivatized
ﬁrms with weak corporate governance have repeatedly demonstrated weak
performance and have frequently been ‘tunneled’ by their manage-
ment....  T h e  l e s s o n  f r o m  postcommunist countries is that eﬀective in-
vestor protection needs to accompany privatization.” They then proceed to
analyze the appropriate forms of corporate governance, addressing in par-
ticular the question as to whether market participants can for themselves
work out appropriate contracts for corporate governance (with the gov-
ernment relegated to the role of contract enforcement) or whether a more
active governmental stance protecting shareholder rights is appropriate.
Johnson and Shleifer then review the growing body of empirical evi-
dence that has emerged on this issue. They provide a concise overview of
much of that empirical evidence, showing the ways in which economists
have been able to provide answers to the basic question as to whether the
legal framework matters. They conclude that “[t]he evidence that legal
rules matter is overwhelming.” While private contracts can to some degree
compensate for the absence of an appropriate legal framework, Johnson
and Shleifer show that the degree to which they can do so is far from ade-
quate. When protection of shareholder rights is in itself weak, stronger in-
vestor protection in stock markets can partially compensate.
Chapter 2, by Philip L. Williams and Graeme Woodbridge, analyzes
Australia’s merger policy and the lessons it may provide for other coun-
tries. They focus on those instances in which there is a trade-oﬀ between
eﬃciency and competition because of economies of scale. In Australia,
there were a signiﬁcant number of cases in which mergers would have re-
sulted in greater eﬃciency, but would simultaneously have reduced com-
petition. Williams and Woodbridge believe that appropriate merger policy
must weigh the trade-oﬀs between the beneﬁts to society of lower costs and
the associated costs of greater concentration of economic power. More-
over, there are beneﬁts to speed in evaluating mergers, and the authorities
must be able to form their judgments based on secret information. These
requirements, in turn, render it diﬃcult to achieve a transparent and fair
process for evaluating mergers. The authors show how Australia’s law gov-
erning mergers was insuﬃciently cognizant of these requirements, and how
the process of approval therefore became informal and secretive in order to
avoid the high costs of public knowledge of the relevant information, and
suggest that a more transparent and fairer process could be devised that
has legal standing.
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use of markets to solve economic policy problems. His analysis focuses on
what he regards as the “middle ground” between government ownership
and purely private governance, which arises when government permits an
activity to be conducted privately but maintains substantial control rights.
To illustrate his points, McMillan uses four examples: emissions trading
(for environmental protection); spectrum auctions (in which public policy
designs the market); electricity regulation (where Californian eﬀorts at
deregulation were badly designed); and ﬁsheries (where the government
sets the quota to protect the “tragedy of the commons” and overﬁshing).
McMillan argues that markets generate information, otherwise unavail-
able to governments, that can be used in the appropriate regulatory envi-
ronment if governments use markets to induce the revelation of needed
information. But, at the same time, markets cannot by themselves solve
public policy problems, and regulation (and information) continues to be
needed (as with the ﬁsheries quota). McMillan concludes, after examining
the four cases, that improper regulation can lead to results as bad as, or
worse than, the market outcome. By the same token, however, appropriate
regulation can in many instances achieve an outcome superior to that at-
tainable in an unfettered private market.
These three papers provide an overview and framework of the theme and
issues of the rest of the volume. They provide important theoretical and
practical insights for individual cases and sectors in diﬀerent countries.
The rest of the volume consists of empirical investigations of particular in-
dustries in a particular country.
The next group of papers examines individual experiences in East Asian
countries. In chapter 4, the ﬁrst paper of this section, Il Chong Nam sur-
veys Korea’s policy toward privatizing the large PSEs. He shows that, until
the 1990s, there was no eﬀort to do so. Then, starting in 1994, a privatiza-
tion movement developed, which culminated in a 1997 law to privatize large
public-sector corporations. This was possible because of a change in the
political regime at that time. Divestitures started after the passage of the
1997 law. Nam shows that the divestitures were not suﬃciently extensive to
prevent the government from intervening in the enterprises. He believes
that limited success resulted from insuﬃcient attention to competition pol-
icy, the regulatory framework, and industry structure. He also notes the
linkages between treatment of the to-be-privatized PSEs and treatment of
the chaebol: they were not initially permitted to bid to take ownership of
any of the PSEs, but they are so important in the Korean economy that
their absence was critical. Further progress in privatization almost cer-
tainly will entail an integration of competition policy, policy toward the
chaebol, and divestiture, illustrating yet again the importance of the infra-
structure and environment in which individual enterprises are privatized.
Korean corporate governance is the focus of Sung Wook Joh’s chapter 5.
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1997, noting the incentives to borrow and the falling proﬁtability of ﬁrms
prior to the outset of the crisis. She then links the ﬁnancial performance of
diﬀerent enterprises with the control and ownership rights prevailing be-
fore the crisis. She found that, controlling for other variables, ﬁrms with a
high controlling-shareholder ownership had better proﬁtability and ﬁnan-
cial performance than did those with much less concentrated ﬁnancial in-
terest. When the disparity between controlling and small shareholder in-
terest was suﬃciently large, however, controlling shareholders followed
their own self-interest and “expropriated small shareholders.” In her
words, “Korean ﬁrms’ low proﬁts persisted because the corporate gover-
nance system did not induce ﬁrm management to maximize ﬁrm value.”
Joh believes that the absence of a credible exit threat, inadequate ﬁnancial
information (including the absence of ﬁnancial institutions monitoring
performance), the virtual absence of minority shareholder rights, and
weak boards of directors all contributed to poor corporate performance,
which in turn triggered the Korean ﬁnancial crisis of 1997. She concludes
that, in the aftermath of 1997, the Korean government has been altering in-
centives to align the interests of major shareholders more closely with
those of maximizing the value of the ﬁrm.
Youngjae Lim, in chapter 6, argues that corporate governance funda-
mentally changed after the economic crisis of 1997 in Korea. Using a ﬁrm-
level data set, he shows that after the crisis, the largest ﬁrms are leaving
banks and switching their ﬁnancing to capital markets, while the small and
medium-sized ﬁrms are increasing their dependence on bank ﬁnancing. A
gap in corporate proﬁts has widened after the crisis. Since banks are losing
their best customers, the future proﬁtability of the bank may be ques-
tioned. Also, changes in the corporate ﬁnance may aﬀect corporate gover-
nance in the future, but it is too early to make deﬁnite statements on these
points.
Chong-Hyun Nam was a conference participant and made excellent
comments during the conference. Since Dr. Lim adopted most of the com-
ments that were suggested by Dr. Nam, we did not include Dr. Nam’s com-
ments in this volume. This is a rare instance where a discussant is so per-
ceptive that his comments are fully adopted and he becomes a “victim of
his own success.” We appreciate Dr. Nam for his appropriate and con-
structive suggestions for improving the paper.
In chapter 7, Chen Chien-Hsun and Shih Hui-Tzu examine the relation-
ship between initial public oﬀerings (IPOs) and corporate governance in
China during the transition. Chen and Shih ﬁnd that IPOs resulted in little,
if any, change in the performance of companies having undergone IPOs
in industries other than public utilities, transportation, and ﬁnance. They
ﬁnd a number of reasons for this. First of all, they note that companies
planning to list an IPO may be tempted to inﬂate earnings or balance-sheet
Introduction 5ﬁgures pre-IPO, thus leading to statistically poor performance after the
IPO. But they also note that “there is too much insider trading, the re-
sponsibilities of the boards of directors are not suﬃciently deﬁned, there is
too much administrative interference, too many problems of internal con-
trol, and so on.” They conclude by noting that the quality of listed compa-
nies is a major factor in determining the health of capital markets in any
country, and that measures that result in improvements in the quality of
IPOs are therefore an important part of the development of China’s capi-
tal markets.
Chapter 8, by David D. Li and Frances T. Lui, seeks to ascertain the de-
terminants of the kinds of state economic enterprises in China that are pri-
vatized. They explore the incentives confronting the government and the
workers that would lead them to decide to privatize. One hypothesis fo-
cuses on the desire, by the government, for greater economic eﬃciency. An-
other is the need to reduce the ﬁscal burden of individual enterprises when
the subsidies from the government get too large.
The authors carry out a probit estimation to examine whether the con-
ditions derived from their theoretical model indeed predict the probability
of privatization or liquidation. Various factors that may contribute to the
probability of privatization/liquidation are analyzed and interpreted. The
authors ﬁnd that their eﬃciency measures did not have a statistically sig-
niﬁcant impact on the decision. They interpret their results to mean that
governments privatize state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in order to increase
government revenue and reduce the size of subsidies. Governments are
more reluctant to privatize when there is likely to be larger resulting un-
employment or when the loss of political control will be more signiﬁcant.
The authors conclude that ﬁrst-best (from the economist’s viewpoint) pri-
vatizations may not be feasible, and that policymakers seeking to improve
economic welfare may be well advised to seek second-best solutions that
take government objectives into account, reducing the size of layoﬀs and
generating large revenues.
In chapter 9, Tetsushi Sonobe and Keijiro Otsuka contrast the town and
village enterprises (TVEs) and SOEs in China. They ﬁrst note that until the
early 1990s, the dominant move away from state ownership was through
the establishment and growth of TVEs; it was only in the 1990s that priva-
tization of SOEs began to take place. They hypothesized that (1) interven-
tion in the management of TVEs by local governments became less pro-
ductive in the 1990s because of the declining importance of SOEs for the
operation of TVEs and (2) recent privatization improved the productive
eﬃciency of TVEs without sacriﬁcing marketing eﬃciency. They use a
unique data set, with information on the garment and casting industries for
the greater Yangtze region.
Using econometric methods and their rich data set, the authors obtained
results that they interpret to relate primarily to the short-run eﬀects of pri-
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eﬀects on productivity in both industries. Privatization and its accompa-
nying beneﬁts accelerated in the mid-1990s, as the relative importance of
SOEs declined and that of free market transactions increased. That, in
turn, made interventions by local governments less productive. They be-
lieve that the greater competition resulting from privatization will continue
to lead to productivity growth over the medium and longer terms.
Reform of the SOEs is one of the most important policy priorities. Yang
Yao’s chapter 10 investigates privatization in China. It shows that politi-
cians’ commitment to reform is important in improving economic perfor-
mance in the private sector. The fewer the political rent-seeking activities,
the better the private-sector performance. Privatization is viewed as the ad-
ditional incentive to engage in reform. The case study of the Shunde region
is presented to show how the reform was successfully implemented in the
region. Government commitment was shown by the reforms in the gov-
ernment sector—consolidation of the government agencies and reduction
in the number of government employees. The eﬃciency and transparency
of the government led to better ﬁrm performance.
The next set of papers focuses on issues of sectoral privatization and reg-
ulation. The ﬁrst, chapter 11 by Helen Owens, covers the behavior of the
Australian railroad industry under various regimes. Alternative methods
of dealing with railroads, as Owens notes, include downsizing by separa-
tion of activities, corporatization, privatization, and renting out the tracks
to competitive service providers. Owens points out that no single method
always works, and that each method has its drawbacks. There is no one
right method for all time. In part, this is a consequence of the fact that rail-
roads had a large element of natural monopoly (although that element has
diminished in recent years), which means that whatever method is used, a
simulation of competition must be achieved by some means. But there is
also the consideration that railroads relieve some of the (untaxed) conges-
tion from highways. To the extent that they do that, they are oﬀsetting a
negative externality. In addition, timetables must be coordinated (for safety
reasons), and technological change (such as air freight) can change the en-
vironment.
Owens oﬀers some tentative conclusions (at least for existing technol-
ogy): If there is suﬃcient competition between transport modes and com-
petition among railroads is possible, vertical separation may be appropri-
ate. If, however, there is little possibility of competition among railroads,
vertical integration makes more sense, accompanied by promotion of com-
petition for the market. When there is market power in a network, vertical
integration is also appropriate, but awarding contracts on the basis of the
lowest rates and periodic recontracting can reduce monopoly rents. She
concludes, however, that the situation must be judged on a case-by-case ba-
sis, and that there is no universal rule.
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Japanese experience with railways. They start by providing background for
the privatization decision, which was based on a desire to reduce both the
government subsidies to railroads (which were one of the three largest in
the 1980s) and the political constraints on railroad operations that con-
tributed to operating deﬁcits. Once privatized, the railroads improved their
performance.
The paper examines the performance of national rail privatization in
several dimensions. First, overall performance is examined. Performance
improved after privatization. Second, the eﬀect of horizontal separation is
evaluated. The sizes of the divided companies are examined by compar-
ing them to privately owned rail companies. Third, vertical integration
was maintained in Japan, while separate infrastructure was created in the
United Kingdom. The authors judge that the vertical integration is eco-
nomically more eﬃcient. Functional separation (freight is separated) also
improves performance. Railroad privatization increases competition in the
market and eﬃciencies of the privatized companies.
In chapter 13, Tsuruhiko Nambu analyzes developments in the Japanese
telecommunications industry since 1985, when privatization and deregula-
tion began. The author argues that privatization with incomplete deregu-
lation has resulted in an unsatisfactory situation in Japan. In part, this is
because the rate structure was left intact at the time of privatization: there
was no attempt to permit competition in some parts of the system with
access fees to the trunk lines, nor was there any rate rebalancing (as was
undertaken in the United Kingdom). Only three long-distance carriers
entered the market, and they earned high rates of return. However, one
of those three has exited the industry, while a second is being acquired by
Vodafone. Nambu argues that some of the additional reform measures,
such as further dividing local companies into regionals, do not make sense,
while some others, such as competition policy with wireline and wireless,
may be beneﬁcial for the economy.
The last two papers focus on the ﬁnancial industry. Charles Calomiris
and Joseph Mason, in chapter 14, consider the policy issues arising from
distressed banks: should they be rescued? On what terms should resources
be transferred to banks? What lessons can be drawn from the experiences
in the past (in particular those in the United States in the 1930s) for Japan
and other Asian countries? With respect to the ﬁrst question, the authors
regard bank ﬁnance as crucial for ﬁnancial intermediation of funds from
savers to investors, especially in countries without strong capital markets,
such as in Asia, and conclude that public policy to intervene in the process
of bank failures (or prevent them) is called for. However, the design of in-
tervention is important in order not to give wrong incentives to banks. The
bank supervision framework should encourage market discipline to re-
ward value creation and prudent risk management. Although costs may be
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currency crisis countries, the bank should be helped. The authors observe
that costs of bank rescues depend on the choice of which banks to rescue
and the means by which rescue is eﬀected. Not all banks may be rescued,
and foreign banks may be encouraged to enter the market, although they
are not perfect substitutes for domestic banks. The rescue eﬀorts should be
focused on relatively solvent banks and those with high franchise values.
Costs of partial bailout should be considered. The rescue eﬀorts should
minimize moral hazard, and that would reduce costs substantially. For ex-
ample, high-risk lending should not be allowed after infusion of govern-
ment capital. The U.S. experience in the 1930s, especially the role of the Re-
construction Finance Corporation, is reviewed and contrasted to the
Japanese experiences of government loans and preferred stock purchases
in 1998 and 1999. The authors recommend combining subsidized pre-
ferred stock purchases with mandatory matching contributions of com-
mon stock, limits on bank dividend payments, and reforms of bank capi-
tal regulation to use market discipline.
The ﬁnal paper, chapter 15, by Aaron Tornell, analyzes the role of bail-
out guarantees that accompany bank privatization and ﬁnancial liberal-
ization in many episodes over the past decade. He argues that where ﬁrms
are constrained in bank credit, bailout guarantees can encourage banks to
lend and enhance long-run growth, provided that they are accompanied by
appropriate policies, such as undertaking bailouts only in cases of systemic
crisis and establishing an eﬃcient regulatory framework. The cost of pur-
suing higher long-run growth is an increased vulnerability to crises. How-
ever, the chance of an actual crisis should be small to avoid the unintended
eﬀect of reducing productive investment. The model analysis is accompa-
nied by a case of policy dilemma caused by the Mexican banking crisis that
followed the currency crisis of 1994–1995.
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